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1972
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AR TICLES
THE REGULATION OF SUBDIVISIONS
Jofl

L. FITZGERALD*

Extraordinary growth m suburban populations is creating complex
physical, social, fiscal, and legal problems. In recent years, the need for
planning has become apparent to enlightened communities. In an effort
to resolve the dilemmas created by rapid urb~n dxpansion, municipalities
have employed devices such as comrhunity.planning and zoning, mapping ordinances, building permit controls, special assessments, the exercise of eminent domain, and urban renewal. Federal revenue sharing on
a more locally autonomous basis than at present, and land grant-rn-aid
contracting may be just beyond-the horizon.."
Subdivision regulation seeks- to ensure that the expanding suburbs
will have adequate parks, schools, streets, flood control facilities, and
shopping centers to ,serve their projected -populations. One writer has
stated that subdivision control is justified by the interests of-and confers' benefits on-the community, the home buyer, the mortgage lender,
and the subdivider.' County planning boards and commissions having
the funcion of administering subdivision control are now authorized
immany states.2

An important device used by communities to regulate subdivisioi
growth is the imposition 6f certain conditions upon the subdivider
which must be satisfied before his plat can be approved. 'These conditions might require the builder to constHct local improvements such
*BA., LL.B., Umversity-of Washmgton; LLM-, Harvard UmversitFSJD., Georgetown University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law.
1. Me11i Subdivision-'Cntrol mn Wisconsin, 1953 Wis. L. REv. 389. See also KaAsOwNEEsHI AND DEVELoPAmfT oF LAND, CAsEs Aft MATERIAlS 536-37 (1961);
Note, Land Subdivision Control, 65 H~Av. L. Ruv. 1226 (1952); Note, An Analysis-of
Subdivision Control Legislation,29 IND. L.J. 544 (1953);,2.'C. A-NTmAu,-LocAL Gov_ iNiar LAW.'131-(1966)"
xowEmC,
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as street curbs or to dedicate portions,of is land for similar purposes.
This Article will examine and evaluate three tests which the courts of
various jurisdictions have applied in order to determine whether such
conditions are valid. In order to.. facilitate this inquiry, the Article
initially will survey the general law of subdivisions. In this regard, it
is necessary to discuss the sources of authority for subdivision regulation and the public policy bases for such authority.
AUTHORITY FOR SUBDIVISION

CONTROL

Subdivision Defined
Subdivision regulation is authorized by state statute. One author has
described the statutory history of the definition of a subdivision in this
wayThe early model enabling legislation did not formally define
subdivision. Thus, Bettman's Model Subdivision Regulation Act
contains no definition, but refers to the process of subdivision as
though it were a word of art. The Municipal Planning Enabling
Act drafted by Bassett and Williams empowers a municipal planning commission "to approve plats showing new streets, highways, or freeways, or the widening thereof," but does not further
define subdivision. Most of the modern enabling statutes include
a definition of subdivision; those that omit such a definition have
been construed to authorize each municipality to define the term.8
Whether a division of land constitutes a "subdivision" must be determined from the definition contained within the statute,, and not from
contradictory definitions that might appear in the regulations of iocal
planning comnussions. 4 If the statutory definition is not satisfied, the
local board has no authority. For example, in Corpus Christi v. Urntarian Church of Corpus Christi,; a church sought plat approval and a
construction permit for church construction on its 2 Y -acre tract. Under
rules formulated by the local planning commission, approval of the
construction was conditioned upon the dedication of an abutting stmp
of land for thepurpose of -widening a street. The church brought a
successful mandamus action. Since the church-did not contemplate
dividing the land into parts, tit was held that the Texas subdivision
3. 3 R. ANDERSON, Ammuc& N LAW OF ZONiNG 380.(1968).
4. ABA Comm. REPORTS ON LOCAL, GowmMENT 100 (1965). See also Peninsula Corp.

v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, i51 Conn. 450, 199 A.2d 1 (1965).
5. 436 S.W 2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 196).
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statute did not apply Further, in the absence of a specific statutory,
charter, or ordinance provision, the local police power would not per
se provide authority for the imposition of such a condition.'
A typical component of a statutory definition of "subdivision" focuses upon the number of parcels into which the tract is to be divided.
The required number of "sub-parcels" may be small. For example, in
In re Sidebotham,r it was held that the California statute defining a
subdivision as the division of property into five or more parcels was not
arbitrary in the choice of "5 or more lots" as a controlling factor.
Subdivision Control
E. C. Yokley, a leading authority, has stated: "The general power
of a local public agency to exercise varying degrees of control over
the development of land subdivision is derived from the general state
statutes, private acts, and municipal charters. Specifically, at the local
level, this power is implemented by subdivision control ordinances and
the rules and regulations of planning commissions." 8
The California enabling statute-the Subdivision Map Act-is typical.
Under its authority, cities and counties may enact local ordinances
implementing the Act. Regulation and enforcement are entirely local
concerns, and no state agency is involved. A home rule city may enact
any regulation so long as no specific restriction or limitation on the
city's power is contained in the charter, and none forbidding the particular condition is included in either the Map Act or the local ordinance. 10 Referring to the California system, one writer has stated:
By allowing local governments to control the "improvement
and design" of new subdivisions, it was hoped that the primary
objectives of the Act would be achieved, e.g. the coordination of
new subdivision designs with those of the community and the assurance that lands dedicated to the public are initially improved
by the subdivider so as to avoid an undue burden on the taxpayer.:"
6. Id. at 929.

7. 12 Cal. 2d 434, 85 P.2d 453 (1939).
8. E. YOKLEY, THE

LAW OF SUBDIVISIONS

7 (1963).

9. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 11506, 11590 (West 1964).
10. See, e.g., Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d i (1949).
11. Comment, Dedication of Land in California, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 559, 571 (1965).
CALIoRNIA SENATE INTERIm
COMM. ON SUBDIVISION.. DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING,
APPENmrx To.JouRNAL OF THE SENATE, Reg-Sess. 15 (1955)..

3
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It should be noted that the community's authority to adopt local ordinances relating to "design and improvement" is not unlimited, but is
restricted by the Act. The local ordinances that may be adopted are
those that are supplemental to and not in conflict with the Act, and those
that bear a reasonable relation to its purposes and requirements. 12
Under the California plan, if the ordinance does not conflict with the
Act, and has a reasonable relation to its purposes, the governing body
of the city may require, as a condition precedent to approval of a plat
or map, that the subdivider comply with reasonable and relevant conditions for design, dedication, and improvement of the land. The
builder may be required to conform with such conditions in order to
promote the safety and general welfare of lot owners in the subdivision
and of the public.'
Professor Allison Dunham has given an excellent summary of the
typical means of ensuring compliance with the statutes involved in subdivision control:
The method of securing submission of the plats for approval
varies, but includes one or more of the following "penalties"
(1) A plat cannot be filed for public record until approval is
certified thereon.
(2) Sale of lots by reference to unrecorded plats is forbidden
by injunction, criminal sanction, or by making such sales voidable
at the option of the purchaser.
(3) A building permit cannot be issued for construction of
buildings not fronting on approved streets.
(4) Public14improvements cannot be constructed in unapproved
subdivisions.
State implementation of such measures generally has accomplished
the desired goals effectively and with 'little complication. Problems
have arisen, however, with respect to the administration of local
restrictions.
Problems of -Ultra-Vires Action
The legislative authorization, to the local governing body should be
clear and reasonably detimte in its terms. More conditions imposed upon
12. 42 CAL. Ju. 2d, Records and Recording Laws 76; Kelber v: Upland, 155 Cal. App.
2d 6M1, 318 P.2d 561 (1957).
13. -Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
14. A. Du-NHAm, MODERN REAL ESrATE TuNSACIONS; CAsEs & MATERmAs

i0 (1958).
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subdividers have failed in the courts for a lack of clear authorization
than for any other reason. 15 Even when the municipal regulation appears to be reasonable, producing only minimal burdens on the subdivider, the courts initally ignore the ordinance and attempt to ascertain whether the enabling act is sufficiently definite. At the other extreme, broad municipal authority has been denied by the courts for
the same reason, leaving open the question of whether such broad
powers could have been asserted successfully had the statutory authonzation been clear.
A good example of an attempt at reasonable and minimal regulation
that failed for want of clear statutory authorization appeared in State
ex rel. Strother v. Chase.'6 In Chase, a Missouri city council's requirement that a subdivider provide an alley within his plat was disallowed
because the council was authorized by statute to require only streets
and avenues. Problems associated with municipal attempts to require
acts of a broader and more drastic nature from the subdivider are
illustrated in In re Lake Secor Development Co.17 In Lake Secor, the
town planning board had attempted to require a subdivider to construct
a water system as a condition precedent to plat approval. The statute
under which the town board derived its power enabled the local board
15. Fitzgerald, The Subdivider's'Responsibilityin Urban Development 3 INsnTuTE oN
121 (1963). See also 3 R. ANDERsoN, ArmEIcAN LAw oF ZoNiNG
400-01 (1968)
16. 42 Mo. App. 343 (1890). In a recent Oklahoma case, Dickey Clay Mfg. Co. v.
Ferguson Inv. Co, 388 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1963), the planning commission's regulations required the subdivider to furnish both a-performance bond and a payment bond with
respect to public improvements and utilities he was required ta supply. The statute
provided only for a performance bond to assure compliance with such conditions. When
the developer did not pay bills owing for materials, the materialman sued and joined
the surety The court held that the commission's regulations, insofar as they required
a payment bond, were ultra vires and, though expressly carried into the surety's bond,
became surplusage and unenforceable. The petition did hot allege reliance upon the
comrmssion's regulations or the bond.
17. 141 Misc. 913, 252 N.Y.S. 809 (Sup. Ct. 1931). In.Beach v. Planning & Zoning
Comm'n, 141 Conn. 79, 103 A.2d 814 (1954), which involves the krind of problenr frequently facing growing mumcipalities, the Planning and Zoning Commission of the
Town of Milford refused to approve a plat for a 145-lot subdivision because the town's
financial condition was not equal to the task of providing school, police and fire protection. The subdivider appealed. The Supreme Court of Errors held that the detailed
statute contained no authority for disapproving subdivision applications on the grofind
of avoiding financial burdens. In Avonside, Inc. v. Zoning & Planning Comm'n, 153
Conn. 232, 215 A.2d' 409 (1965), the" Supreme Court of Connecticut held that a towns
subdivision regulation requiring a developer to pay fees based on a percentage of the
cost of constructing streets and making other public improvements set forth in the
subdivision plan exceeded the town's statutory authorization and was-therefore, invalid.
PLANNING AND ZONING
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to impose only such conditions as were related to streets, light, and air.
The water system requirement was disallowed on the ground that the
statute made no mention of such a power. Another example of this

type of case is Sussex Woodlands, Inc. v. Mayor and Council of the
Township of West Milford. - The subdivider in Sussex Woodlands
sought to subdivide an 800-acre tract by conveying one three-acre lot
to a purchaser. The town planmng board, pursuant to its ordinance,
conditioned approval of the minor subdivision on the payment of
back taxes for the entire 800-acre tract. The subdivider brought an
action challenging the town's authority to so regulate, and relief was
granted since there was no statute expressly authorizing the payment
of back taxes as a part of subdivision regulation.
THE BASES OF SUBDIVISION REGULATION

Depending on the nature of the subdivision statute and the factual
conditions presented, the courts have sustained subdivision regulation
on various grounds. Among the more common are the following:
(1) The subdivider voluntarily requests local approval in order to record his plat, and therefore must subject himself to regulation. (2)
Local control over the subdivision street layout is necessary to accomplish conformity with the city street design so as to avoid traffic chaos.
Also, the land description must conform to city surveys in order to
permt identification of owners and their properties on the tax rolls.
(3) Regulation is an inherent police power necessary to promote the
public health, safety, and general welfare. (4) The subdivider causes
a burden upon mumcipal services and, along with the ultimate purchasers of the plots, receives tangible benefits from the conditions he is
required to fulfill and the improvements he is compelled to make. 19
The logic supporting the first two bases for regulation is too obvious
to require discussion. The third basis is illustrated in the leading case

of Ayres v. City Council of City of Los Angeles.20 This was a manda-

mus proceeding where the subdivider sought to compel the city council
to approve a subdivision map without requiring compliance with con18. 109 N.J. Super. 432, 263 A.2d 502 (1970). The court distinguished Economy Enterprises, Inc. v. Manalapan Township Comm'n, 104 N.J. Super. 373, 250 A.2d 139 (1969),
which upheld the implied right of a mumcipality to require a subdivider to pay inspecnon fees, where such fees were shown to correspond roughly with township subdivision
regulation expenses. The conditions imposed, said the court, must be limited to controls
relating to the physical development of the property
19. See Fitzgerald, supra note i5, at 121-23.
20. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
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ditions that had been imposed by the city planning commission. These
conditions required that the builder dedicate a 10-foot strip of land
along an abutting major boulevard for widening purposes, that an extension of a street in the subdivision be dedicated to a width of 80
feet (rather'than the 60-foot dedication proposed by the builder), that
a splinter area proposed for development be dedicated for street use,
and that an additional 10-foot strip of the builder's land be restricted
to the planting of trees and shrubbery
Petitioner argued that the only enforceable conditions were those
that were specified in the Map Act or in ordinance provisions not conflictmg with the Act. After a lengthy recital of the Act's provisions,
the court addressed itself to the subdivider's argument in language that
has been cited repeatedly and relied upon in subsequent decisions. The
court stated its test as follows:
[C] onditions are lawful which are reasonably required by the subdivision-type and'use as related to the character of local and neighborhood planning and traffic conditions.
[I]t is the petitioner who is seeking to acquire the advantages of lot subdivision and upon him rests the duty of compliance
with reasonable conditions for design, dedication, improvement
and restrictive use of the land so :s to conform to the safety'and
general welfare of the lot owners in thie subdivision and of the
I
public.2 1
The court upheld each condition as being xeasonably related to the
promotion of the public welfare. Each condition also was found to be
"reasonably required by the subdivision type and use as related to the
22
character of local and neighborhood. planning and traffic conditions."'
The fourth basis of regulation may be illustrated by the case of

City of Bellefontaine Neighbors v. J I Kelley Realty & Building Co.28
There, the applicable statute required that bef6re a subdivision plat
could be recorded, it had to be approved by the local common council, which -was empowered to. reqture'changes" to make- the plat conform to any street development plan.2 4 Pursuant to the statute, the
city required a subdivider to pave a street within his subdivision as a
21. Id. at -, 207 P.2d,at 5, 7.
22. Id. at -, 207 P.2d at 5.
23. 460 S.W 2d 298 (Mo. Ct. App, 1970).
-24. Mo.R~v. STAT. § 445.030 (1949),
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condition precedent to plat approval. The court upheld this condition
in these words:
The development of streets is a matter peculiarly within the province of the City The mere desire of a subdivider to develop land
does not give him the right to compel development and improvement of streets at public expense within the area controlled by him.
The City may refuse to permit such subdivision development
unless that expense is borne by the subdivider.2
Conditions of this nature are approved because public policy allows
a city to require the subdivider, who is seeking a profit, to facilitate
mumcipal development by making the original installation of site improvements. The city then generally assumes the maintenance and
control over streets, alleys, water lines, sewers, parks, and recreational
areas within the subdivision.26
CusTOMARY ADMINISTRATIVE CONDITIONS IMPOSED ON THE
SUBDIVIDER PRECEDENT TO APPROVAL OF THE PLAT

When discussing conditions precedent to plat approvals, it is appropriate to focusupon two important conditions which may be imposed
upon subdividers. Imtially, situations where the approving authority attempts torequire the construction of improvements should be examined.
Next, situations where the approving authority seeks to compel the-subdivider to dedicate a portion of his land for public use, or to make payments to the city in lieu of a dedication of his land, should be analyzed.

:Construction of Improvements
It has become commonplace, 27 although there are exceptions, 28 for
the courts to uphold requirements made by mumcipalities or their
approving authorities that a subdivider construct certain kinds of im.provements within the platted area. The following list is representative of the required improvements whch the courts generally have
sustained:
-

(a) Sidewalks, curbs, gutters, street gradings, and stabilized road
.surfaces;a
25. 460 S.W.2d at 303.
.
S26Y.--."kr, suPra nte'8-at'I29. ....
27. See, e.g., Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
28. See, e.g., Kesselring v. Wakefield Realty Co., Inc., 306 Ky. 725, 209:S.W.2d 63
&E2d
5,69 (.1952).
(Ct. App. 1948); State ex rel. Weber v. Vajne2t92 Ohib App; 233,'108 3
29. Evola v. Wendt Constr. Co, 170 Cal. App.,2d 21, -338 P.2d 498-(1959); etteson
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(b) Surface drainage, storm water, and drainage facilities; 80
(c) Sanitary sewage facilities and water. systems or facilities;'
(d) Subdivision streets of increased width and street extensions; 32 and
(e) Installation of-or restrictions on the use of-access streets
33
to existing roads.

In California, the Subdivision Map Act explicitly states that street
grading, surfacing, sanitary and storm sewers, and water marns are
"improvements" which may be required by a city 8 4 If, however, other
improvements "directly benefit ' ' the subdivision in question, they also
may be upheld, even though there is no express statutory grant of
power. For example, in-City of Buena Park v. Boyer,35 a subdivider
challenged the right of the city's planning commission to demand a
$50,000 contribution for construction of an open drainage ditch to
v..City of Naperville, 9 IlM. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956); Allen v. Stockwell, 210 Mich.
488, 17.8 N.W 27 (1920); Blevms v. City of Manchester, 103 N.H. 284, 170 A.2d 121
(1965); Levm v. Livingston Township, 35 NJ. 500, 173 A.2d 391 (1961); SE-Frank
Developers, Inc. v. Gibson, 157 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1956); West Norriton Township
v. Abel Inv. Co, 19 Pa. D. & C. 2d 58, 73 York 157 (C. P. 1961). But see Lewis v.
Minneapolis, 140 Minn. 433, 168 N.W 188 (1910), which held a street grading requrement invalid for lack of authorizaton.
30. City of Buena Park-v. Boyar, 186 Cal. App. 2d 61, 8 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1960); Mefford
v. City of Tulare, 102 Cal. App. 2d 919, 228 P.2d 847 (1951); Petterson v. City of Napervile, 9 IMI.2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956); Blevms v. City of Manchester, 103 N.H. 284,
170 A.2d 121 (1965). But see Castle Estates, Inc. v. Park & Planning Bd, 344 Mass. 329,
182 N.E.2d 540 (1962), invalidating water supply and drainage conditions because the
planning board had not adopted adequate regulations under the statute to sustain the
conditions inposed.
-- 31. -Mefford v. City of Tulare, 102 Cal. App. 2d 919, 228 P.2d 857 (1951); Petterson
v. City of Naperville, 9 IlM.2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956); Blevins v. City of Manchester, 103 N.H. 284; 170 A.2d 121 (1965); Lake Intervale Homes, Inc. v. Township of
Parsippany-Troy Hills, 28 N.J. 423, 147 A.2d 28 (1958); Medine v. Bums, 29 Misc. 2d
890, 208 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup. Ct. 1960); SE-Frank Developers, Inc. v. Gibson, 157 N.YS.2d
812 (Sup. Cr. 1956); Zastrow v. Village of Brown Deer, 9 Wis. 100, 100 N.W.2d 359
(1960).
32. Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949); Petterson v. City of
Naperville, 9 11. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
38. City of Sierra Madre v. Superior Ct., Cal. App. 2d -,
12 Cal. Rptr. 836
(1961); Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949); Krieger v. Planning
Comm'n, 167 A.2d 886 (Md. Ct. App. 1961); Town of Stoneham v. Savelo, 341 Mass.
456, 170 N.E.2d 417 (1960). See Medine v. Bums, 29 Misc. 2d 890, 208 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup.
Ct- 1960), which held that statutory authority was lacking for the imposition of the condition; If authority were conferred specifically,- the statute would be constitutional under
Brous '. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 106.N.E.2d 503 (1952).
-84. See CAL. Bus. & PaoF.CoDE S 11511 (West 1964).
35. 186 Cal. App. 2d 61, 8 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1960)..' -
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service the subdivided area. The city demanded the $50,000 paymentin addition to a promise to install streets, curbs, gutters, and sidewalksas a condition precedent to the city's acceptance of the builder's map.
The California District Court of Appeals held that the money paid
to the city was "to be expended for the direct benefit of the subdivision,
for drainage purposes, and such drainage facility was sorely needed
for
the general use of the lot owners in the subdivision." Thus,
even though California legislation did not expressly permit such a local
requirement, the required payment for construction of drainage facilities was allowed because it conferred a direct benefit on purchasers of
the subdivided lots.
Judicial review of the conditions imposed by a city and challenged
by a subdivider turns upon a determination of whether the conditions
are reasonably required in the interests of public safety and convenience.
Problems of arbitrariness could arise if, for example, streets of unusually
large width or of unduly expensive pavement were demanded. However, the California Attorney General stated in a 1964 opinion that an
ordinance could require that a subdivider dedicate curved rather than
straight streets, if such a requirement were not based solely on aesthetic
considerations. According to the Attorney General, such a requirement would be authorized. by the Map Act because it controls street
"alignment," and it probably would be constitutional because the slowmg of neighborhood traffic would tend to make the subdivision safer
for local residents. 6
Dedication of Land
Compulsory dedications of land for public use or payments in lieu
of a dedication have produced more legal difficulty than conditions
requiring construction of improvements within the subdivision. Example of the more troublesome- conditions include requirements that
the subdivider -construct public utility connections to points outside
the subdivision or pay the construction charges for such connections;
requirements that the subdivider reserve or dedicate strips of his land
for the future -widening of streets which adjoin his subdivision; and
requirements that open space be reserved or dedicated for parks, playgroundsi school sites, or other public grounds, or that a contribution
be made toward the cost of acquiring land elsewhere for these purposes.
The New York State expeiience -iustrates the complex problems
that can result from statutes requiring the dedication of land. A 1959
36. 43 Op. CAL. AnT'y GEN. 89 (1964).
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amendment to the subdivision statute states that whenever the dedicanon of land is impractical, local planning boards may require as a condition precedent to plat approval the payment of money in lieu of
dedication. The amount of the payment is determined by the board
37
and is to be used as a trust fund to maintain neighborhood parks.
However, another portion of the same statute provides that the owner
of the land, by adding a notation to the proposed plat stating that he
does not intend to offer any land to be dedicated for streets, highways,
or parks, may avoid the imposition of such conditions. Also, such a
notation eliminates the need to pay a sum of money in lieu of dedication. These provisos appear to vitiate the substantive portion of the
statute to the extent that a local governmental body cannot effectively
condition approval of a plat on a requirement of dedication.
Apart from internal inconsistencies that are apparent in some statutes,
there are several other problems concerning the dedication of land.
The most important is a determination of when a local government may
require a subdivider to dedicate a portion of his land for some public
purpose. More specifically, what type of commumty benefit will support a municipal requirement that land be dedicated in order to gain
subdivision approval? It should be noted that this matter is particularly important to the subdivider who must dedicate his land without
reimbursement, as opposed to eminent domain proceedings which
usually involve payment for the property appropriated.
There are several approaches to the problems associated with conditions requiring the dedication of land for public purposes such as
school facilities. The Ayres decision, which was discussed above,
typifies one position. Ayres enunciated the test of whether the conditions are reasonably related to the type of subdivision proposed. If
they are, the conditions will be upheld; otherwise they are invalid. In
the following portion of this Article, other approaches will be discussed
in order to formulate conclusions as to which method is superior.
A second approach has been adopted by courts in Illinois, where the
37. N.Y. TowN LAw § 277 (McKinney 1959). The statute reads m part:
[Sluch plat shall show in proper cases and when requirec by the planning
board, a park or parks suitably located for playground or other recreational purposes. If the planning board deterrmnes that a suitable park or
parks of adequate size cannot be properly located in any such plat or is
otherwise not practical, the board may require as a condition to approval
of any such plat a payment to the town of a sum to be deterrmned by the
town board, which sum shall constitute a trust fund to be used by the town
exclusively for neighborhood park, playground, or recreation purposes including the acquisition of property
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supreme court has invalidated conditions requiring dedication of land
for recreational and educational facilities38 and cash contributions for
the same purposes.39 The test appears to be whether the condition
which is imposed is sufficiently related to the needs of the subdivision.
In Rosen v. Village of Do'wners Grove,40 the court held that a condition
imposing costs upon a subdivider is valid only when the costs are "specifically and uniquely attributable" to his activity 4 Accordingly, in
Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect,42 a requirement for the dedication of one acre of land for each 60 residental building sites or family living units was invalidated. If it had been
applied to the plaintiff subdivider, he would have been required to
dedicate 6.7 acres to obtain approval of his 250-lot subdivision. The
court, rejecting the village's argument concerning the congested condition of the school facilities, stated: "[T]he school problem which
allegedly exists here is one which the subdivider should not be obliged
to pay the total cost of remedying, and to so construe the statute would
amount to the exercise of the power of eminent domain without compensation." 43

A third approach is illustrated by court decisions in New York,
California, and Montana. In the recent case of Jenad, Inc. v. Village of
Scarsdale,44 the Court of Appeals of New York validated a condition
requiring a subdivider to pay a fee in lieu of providing land. Jenad
sought to recover a fee paid to the municipality in lieu of providing
land, so the question of dedication was not confronted directly Nevertheless, the court referred to the power to compel dedication and cited
Wisconsin and Montana cases which were similar to Jenad and had
upheld dedication requirements. The Jenad court was divided four to
three, and the dissent pointed out that, by upholding the mumcipality's
extraction of a fee in lieu of setting land aside, the majority in effect
had allowed the municipality to require dedication.45 The dissent
argued that the majority opinion would be authority for assessing sub38. See, e.g., Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 IMI.
2d 375,
176 N.E.2d 799 (IMI.
1961).
39. See, e.g., Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 IMl.2d 380, 167 N.E.2d 230 (Ill.
1960)..
40. 19 I. 2d 380, 167 N.E.2d 230 (IMI.1960).
41. Id. at -,

42.
43.
44.
45.

167 N.E.2d at 233.

22 IMI.
2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (IMI.1961).
Id.
18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.YS.2.d 955 (1966).
Id. at 86-92, 218 N.E.2d at 677-80, 271 N.Y.S. 2d at 959-65.
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dividers for general public purposes without regard to special benefits
received by the subdivision. Petitioner in Jenad had contended, inter
alia, that the fee constituted an unauthorized tax. The court answered
that the fees were not a tax at all, but were a reasonable form of village
planning for the general community welfare.
Jenad appears to grant broader powers to local regulators than would
be allowed under Rosen and its "specifically and uniquely attributable"
test. Additionally, Jenad, unlike Ayers, does not require that the condition be related to the type of subdivision proposed by the builder.
Jenad appears to allow any condition that would support the general
public welfare, as long as the subdivision itself also would benefit from
the condition. Jenad's apparent broad grant of local discretion is not
unlimted, however.
In another New York decision, East Neck Estates, Ltd. v. Luchsinger,40 an intermediate court held that confiscation suggests the upper
limit of the public power to compel "dedication." The court found
that the requirement of dedication of shore frontage by a subdivider
for park purposes would result in a $90,000 decrease in value of land
worth $208,000. Although the broad policy underlying the requirement
apparently was a desire to maintain public access to the beach, the court
concluded that the standards of reasonableness and due process had
been exceeded. The court recognized that Jenad granted local planning
boards the right to require payment of money or land but concluded
that standards of due process still were paramount. Moreover, doubt
has been expressed in an administrative opinion as to whether a local
unit may require the dedication of land for school purposes as a prerequisite to approval of a subdivision plat.47
The California Supreme Court adopted a similar approach in Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut
Creek.48 The plaintiff, a non-profit corporation organized to promote
the home building industry, brought a class action attacking certain city
ordinances enacted under the authority of section 11546 of the Business
and Professions Code, which provided that municipalities could require
46. 61 Misc. 2d 619, 305 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
47. Op. N.Y. STAT- COMPTROLLER 68-939. Two recent

articles advance the opinion
that an administrative requirement of dedication of land lor police or fire station sites
also would not be allowed. Reps & Smith, Control of Urban Land Subdivision, 14
SYRAcuSE L. REv. 405 (1963); Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing
Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents through Subdivision Exactions,
73 YALE LJ. 1119, 1137 (1964).
"48. 4 Ca: 3d 633, 484 P.d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971).
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the dedication of land, the payment of fees in lieu of such dedication, or
a combination of the two, for park and recreational purposes as a condition to approval of a subdivision plat. The statute required the ordinance to include definite standards to determine the proportion of the
subdivision to be dedicated, or the amount of any fee to be taken in
lieu thereof. Such dedication or payment could be used only to provide parks or recreational facilities to serve the subdivision. The statute
further required that the dedication bear a "reasonable relationship"
to the use of the park and recreational facilities by future inhabitants
of the subdivision. Fees alone could be required with respect to a subdivision containing 50 parcels or less. The city had enacted an ordinance complying with the statute.
The court rejected the subdivider's contention-which may have
been based on the Rosen rationale-that dedication is a valid condition
only if the subdivision will increase the need for recreational facilities
to such an extent that additional land for such facilities will be required.
The subdivider's other argument-that dedication was valid only if
directly related to the health and safety of the residents of the development, as would be the case with sewer facilities-was held to have been
satisfied, since park and recreational facilities are sufficiently related to
the health and welfare of subdivision residents. The court rejected
the rule followed in Illinois (that the need for recreational facilities
must be "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the subdivision),
drawing support for its conclusion from the recent adoption of article
XXVIII of the California Constitution. The new article provides that
it is in the best interests of the state to maintain and preserve open
space lands to assure the enjoyment of natural resources and scenic
beauty for the economic and social well-being of the state and its citizens. However, it should be noted that nothing in the article provides
that the open space is to be supplied at the subdivider's expense rather
than at the cost of the state. The article may well have been intended
only to ease the burden of the state in proving that it is serving a public
purpose when it condemns and purchases land in order to facilitate
the general economic and social well being of its citizenry 49
49. The subdivider also contended that subsection (f) of the statute was unconstitutional since it delegated arbitrary power to the city to decide when the development
of the recreational facility will begin and empowered the city to require fairly immediate development in one instance and lengthy postponement in another. The court
found little merit in this contention, reasoning that needs would vary from one neighborhood to another and that the city's resolution that the improvements should begin as the
need developed provided a sufficiently definite standard.. The court noted that relief
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The court in Walnut Creek found that a majority of modern decisions would uphold the constitutionality of fee conditions of the kind
authorized by the statute in controversy This appears to be true when
the statute expressly authorizes the city to impose the condition and
the condition is reasonable as applied to the particular subdivision. The
court based its holding on the state's police power, reasoning that the
subdivider receives valuable benefits from subdivision approval, and
therefore may be required to dedicate land for park purposes "whenever the influx of new residents will increase the need for park and
recreational facilities." 50 The court rejected the Illinois court's construction of Ayres as limiting the power to impose dedication conditions
to situations where the "burden cast upon the subdivider is specifically
and umquely attributable to his activity.
" -1The Califorma Supreme
Court succinctly stated that, "the Ayres case cannot be interpreted
in this manner

52
",

The broadest statement of the Jenad rule is found in a Montana case.
In Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County,58 the Montana
Supreme Court held that a state statute requiring subdividers to dedicate
a portion of their subdivision for public parks and playgrounds was a
reasonable condition precedent to governmental approval of the subdivider's plats. The builder submitted plats that conformed to all the
requirements, except that he made no provision for the dedication of
land to be used for public parks or playgrounds. The applicable statute
could be provided to the subdivider if permission to develop were delayed unreasonably.
The question, however, -was whether the statute, not the- resolution, was adequate.
The statute appeared to direct the city to make .a practical survey of its needs m connection with requests for approval of subdivision maps and to "specify when development
will begin.' It is submtted that the disposition made of this issue in the lower
court is more sound and in accordance with established precedent. That court interpreted the statute as contemplating a "reasonable time" within which development should
begin after subdivision occupancy The California Supreme Court may have felt that the
lower court's construction of -the statute would restrict the city's discretion more than
the high court considered necessary or desirable.
The plaintiff further contended that subdividers of 50 parcels or less were required
only to pay fees, while subdividers of more numerous parcels rmght be required to
-dedicate land, even though the same amount of acreage might be involved in both
situations. The merits of this contention were. demed on the logical basis that the city
ordinance interpolated both the amount of fees and the amount of land into a value
ratio which was applied to subdivisions. Thus, the required fee is equal to the value
of the land required to be dedicated under the governing body's formula.
50. 4 Cal. 3d at 644, 484 P.2d at 615, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
51. Id. at 644 n.13, 484 P.2d at 615, n.13, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 639 n.f3.
52. Id. See also Fitzgerald, supra note 15.
53. 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964).
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provided: "For the purpose of promoting the public comfort, welfare,
and safety, such plat and survey must show that at least one-ninth of
the platted area [for land between 10 and 20 acres in size] . . is forever dedicated to the public for parks and playgrounds." 54 The plats
were rejected, and the subdivider brought an action in a state court to
challenge the validity of the dedication requirement. The court, rejecting the subdivider's contention that the requirement was an unreasonable exercise of the police power, stated that in deternuning what
is reasonable the court must look not only to past decisions, but also
to future exigencies. 5 The court emphasized that the standard must
keep pace with the growth of knowledge, the expanding economy,
and human progress in general. It also noted that no law required the
plaintiff to sell by subdividing and that since a city can impose any
reasonable condition precedent to plat approval, in theory at least, the
owner of a subdivision voluntarily dedicates sufficient land for streets
in return for the advantages and privilege of having his plat recorded.
Playground dedication, said the court, is not inherently different from
dedication of streets and alleys. If the subdivision creates the specific
need for parks, then it is reasonable to charge the subdivider with the
burden of providing them.56
The court stated that the question of when sufficient need exists had
already been determined by statute, which was flexible enough to be
used for subdivisions of all sizes. The court concluded that this determmaton of need was within the power of the legislature and, thus,
will not be overturned if "there is any rational basis upon which [it]
can be upheld." 57 Since it found no evidence justifying a different
conclusion, the court upheld the statute.
CONCLUSION

Generally, courts have adopted one of three different tests when
determimng whether a condition of dedication is valid. The Ayres court
concluded that such conditions will be upheld when they are reasonably related to the subdivision and the surrounding locality The
second test, which has been applied by Illinois courts in the Rosen and
.Pioneer Trust cases, requires the condition to be "specifically and
uniquely attributable" to the subdivider's activities in order to be upheld.
54. Id. at

55. Id. at
56. id. at
57. Id. at

-,

-,

394 P.2d at 184.
394 P.2d at 186.

-,

394 P.2d at 187

-,

394 P.2d at 188.
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The third test, which seems to have the widest following, upholds conditions of dedication when such conditions enhance the general public
welfare, so long as it does not amount to confiscation. This latter test,
the so-called Walnut Creek rule, is the broadest, and it allows a great
deal of leeway to a locality in dealing with subdividers.
It is submitted that the Ayres test represents a rmddle ground between
the other tests and should be followed by other courts. This approach
would seem to avoid the rigidity of the Illinois rule while also avoiding
the undue flexibility inherent in Walnut Creek. Ayres teaches that a
rational physical connection should be present between the condition
which is unposed and the effect that the proposed subdivision would
have on the surrounding area. Total city needs would not be a proper
consideration as they implicitly may be under the Walnut Creek rationale. It seems inappropriate to burden a subdivider with the needs
of the general public welfare. Although such needs must be considered
when regulating a city's growth, a subdivider should not be required
to pay for such improvements when they are found to be only in the
general public interest as opposed to having a rational connection with
the subdivision. General public benefits should be paid for by the city

